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Cameron Pulsifer 
Tiis paper will examine the manner in which the infantry troops of the 
British garr i son in Victorian Halifax 
p r e p a r e d t h e m s e l v e s t o mi l i t a r i ly 
confront an enemy in the field. It is based 
upon extensive research carried out on 
the Halifax garrison for the years 1869 
to 1871, which covers the time that the 
78th Highlanders were in the city. (This 
of course is the regiment that the re-
enac tment un i t "garrisoning" today's Citadel 
represents.1) It will focus in particular on one 
major exercise that was held in these years in 
the hope tha t it will shed some light on the 
battlefield methods that may have been adopted 
in the period should the fortress have been 
attacked. It will be concerned especially with 
the manner that Halifax military authorities were 
adapting to the new age of rifled breech-loading 
small a rms , which were then revolutionizing 
battlefield procedures. 
Halifax, the Nova Scotian capital, was at this 
time a city of 29,000 people, the fourth largest in 
British North America. Since its founding in 1749 
the port had been critical to the Royal Navy's 
defence of the North Atlantic, and virtually from 
the beginning the British army had maintained 
a garrison there to guard against its being taken 
by an enemy. For 156 years, until its withdrawal 
in 1905, this garrison waited and kept watch for 
an attack that never came. The mid-Victorian 
period is an especially interesting one in the 
history of the Halifax naval station. This was an 
age of g r ea t t echno log ica l u p h e a v a l , wi th 
sweeping changes introduced to the design and 
construction of warships as well as to 
the methods and techniques of artillery 
and small a rms manufacture. Warships 
were now for the m o s t p a r t s t e am-
powered and iron-hulled, artillery (after 
a brief and unsuccessful flirtation with 
breech-loading methods) was muzzle 
loading and rifled, while the latest small 
a r m s were b o t h rifled a n d b r e e c h -
loading. These developments had for a 
time thrown into question traditional notions 
concerning the relative power of ships versus 
s h o r e - b a s e d defences , a n d h a d g e n e r a t e d 
fundamental reappraisals of the manner in which 
infantry was to conduct itself in the field when 
facing the enemy. Some attention h a s been paid 
to the m a n n e r tha t the artillery and coastal 
defences of Halifax had been adapted to meet 
the new conditions, b u t little or no at tempt h a s 
as yet been made to assess the manner that the 
infantry defenders of Halifax were either adapting, 
or failing to adapt, to the new conditions.2 This 
gap will be filled through a close examination of 
a large-scale training exercise - the so-called 
"Battle of Rockhead" of March 1871 - that was 
held in Halifax at one of the nodal points of this 
era of uncertainty. 
The strategic context in which Halifax was 
s i t u a t e d w a s b e i n g r e t h o u g h t b y B r i t i s h 
politicians and defence planners at this time. As 
noted, Halifax had always been an important 
factor in the naval defence of the North Atlantic 
sea lanes; bu t the prevailing system had until 
now been one of 'colonial' defence, under which 
the forces of the British military had been spread 
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Above: South Ravelin, Halifax Citadel, ca. 1860, 
looking southeast towards McNab's Island. The 
scene would have been essentially similiar in 
1871 at the time of the Battle of Rockhead, except 
by this time the 32-pounder smoothbore at the 
salient had been replaced by a 7-inch Armstrong 
Rifled Breech Loader. The shorter 32-pounder 
guns in the embrasures along the left face would 
have still been in place. (They were removed in 
the mid-1870s). 
(Sir Charles Hastings Doyle Collection, 
National Archives of Canada, C-25755) 
Left: Gateway at the Halifax Citadel, ca. 1880. 
(NAC PA 119754) 
one of these impor tan t s ta t ions , along with 
Bermuda, Gibraltar, and Malta. Termed "Imperial 
Fortresses" these four strategic outposts were 
deemed critical enough to the defence of the 
mother country to be maintained on the home, 
as opposed to the colonial, defence estimates. In 
other words the context was moving from one of 
"colonial" to "imperial" defence, as Brian Tunstall, 
Don Schurman, and Norman Gibbs, amongst 
others, have discussed at length.3 
These new priorities were of course behind 
the extensive upgrading of the Halifax defences 
widely throughout the empire acting in many 
areas in a mostly local defence capacity. With 
the election in 1869 of the government of William 
E w a r t G l a d s t o n e , t h i s b e g a n t o c h a n g e 
dramatically. Many of these localized forces were 
withdrawn - by the end of 1871 the last British 
troops had left Canada, with the exception of 
Halifax. Henceforth, the emphasis was placed on 
the home islands a n d upon certain strategic 
stations along the world's sea lanes from which 
the ships of the Royal Navy could operate to 
protect ocean traffic bound for Britain or to 
interdict that bound for enemy ports. Halifax was 
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that was underway at this time, by the end of which 
the port fairly bristled with the latest in modern 
armament. Thus batteries of mostiy 9 and 10-inch 
rifled muzzle loading guns were located at McNab's 
Island and York Redoubt at the harbours mouth, 
along the shores of Point Pleasant, at Fort Clarence 
on the Dartmouth shore (on the site of the present-
day oil refinery), on George's Island, and along the 
ramparts of the Citadel. Indeed, when they were 
completed towards the middle of the decade it can 
probably be safely stated that for a brief time, the 
Halifax artillery and coastal defences were "state of 
the art" (even if lacking in sufficient trained 
p e r s o n n e l t o a d e q u a t e l y m a n them) . 4 The 
preparedness of the infantry somewhat further 
in land does not inspire the same degree of 
confidence, however. 
It should be noted that there were always two 
British infantry regiments in garrison at this time, 
each numbering about 700 men. During the years 
in question there were besides the 78th, firstly the 
1st Battalion, 16th (Bedfordshire) Regiment of Foot, 
and latterly, the 61st (South Gloucestershire) 
Regiment. Besides the infantry there were also three 
Batteries of Royal Artillery, numbering about 350, 
and a contingent of Royal Engineers, numbering 
about 100 men. 
The following account makes extensive use of 
local newspapers as a source of information. 
Newspapers, of which a total often were published 
in Halifax at this time, are of course notoriously 
unreliable in certain respects. In politics at this time 
they were fervently devoted to espousing the 
viewpoint of one or other of the two major political 
parties, a middle ground or neutral position being 
practically unheard of. Also, in terms of simple 
description they often got things wrong, depending 
upon the knowledge or perceptiveness of the 
reporter doing the describing. Used carefully and 
in conjunction with other sources, however, they 
are an indispensable mine of information on the 
activities of the mili tary wi thin the Halifax 
community; 'windows into the past ' in certain 
respects, although you can see more clearly through 
some panes than others. For the events discussed 
here they are the most fruitful source of information 
available, the official military documentation being 
unaccountably silent about them. Thus a number 
of fairly l eng thy desc r ip t ions from Halifax 
newspapers will be quoted below, and then an 
attempt will be made to draw some conclusions 
based upon them. 
In examining the role of the infantry in Halifax 
in the Victorian period one does tend to become 
somewhat bogged down in business associated with 
military discipline, regimental a n d garr i son 
administration, and ongoing routines of various 
descriptions. One tends to forget that the essential 
reason for troops being in the city was to fight, in 
the eventuality that the port was ever attacked. In 
this period the most likely threat still came from 
the United States. What then can be said about the 
manner in which they prepared themselves to meet 
such an eventuality? 
In fact, it would seem that the incidences of 
any such training exercises being carried out at all 
in Halifax in these years were few. Although fairly 
large-scale military manoeuvres were carried out 
in England for the first time in 1871 and repeated 
over the next three years (when they ceased 
completely until the 1890s),5 reference has been 
found to only four exercises in these years that can 
in anyway be construed as field or operational 
training in Halifax. Two of these were small-scale 
sham fights which took place in conjunction with 
winter route marches. The other two are discussed 
here, one a formalized sham fight on the Common 
for visiting royalty in August 1869, and the other a 
m u c h more e l abo ra t e affair he ld in the 
neighbourhood of Rockhead city prison at the 
extreme north end of the city in March 1871. 
Certainly none of these exercises were of the sort 
that would have adequately prepared the defenders 
of Halifax to meet a determined, well armed modern 
enemy. 
British tactical doctrine was at this time still 
coming to grips with the great upheaval in European 
battlefield practice occasioned by the advent of long-
range, rifled, breech-loading fire arms. Although the 
American Civil War of 1862-65 h a d amply 
demonstrated the devastating effects of rifled small 
arms, these were for the most part muzzle-loading. 
Rifled breech-loading arms were first widely used 
by the Prussians in their victory over Denmark in 
1864, and they had been deemed a sufficient 
success that the British army had its muzzle-loading 
Enfield rifle, first introduced during the Crimean 
war in the early 1850s, converted into the breech 
loading Snider-Enfield in 1865. This was the 
weapon with which the troops in Halifax were armed 
during the events discussed here. The continued 
success of this type of arm in Prussia's victory over 
Austria in 1866 further drove home the lessons of 
the earlier campaign that the new weapons' range, 
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accuracy, and above all, speed of fire, and the 
fact they could be loaded and fired from a prone 
position, had spelt the kiss of death for older, 
more formalized battlefield practices. 
By 1869 the conclusion seems to have been 
reached within the British army that henceforth 
all troops should adopt the practices of light 
infantry. Thus , in outlining the duties of the 
regimental commanding officer, the 1868 edition 
of t ha t indispensable text book of approved 
military procedures, Queen's Regulations, noted 
for the first time that this individual was "to avail 
h imsel f of every oppo r tun i t y of pract ical ly 
ins t ruct ing the officers in the duties of light 
infantry." 
The improved range and accuracy of fire of the 
arms now in general use [it continued] render it 
doubly important that every soldier should when 
s k i r m i s h i n g , be p r e p a r e d to take s u c h 
advantage of ground and cover as will enable 
him, with the least exposure to his own person, 
to inflict the greatest amount of injury on his 
opponents; with this view commanding officers 
are enjoined to lose no opportunity of profiting 
by all suitable ground in the vicinity of their 
quarters for the instruction of young soldiers in 
this important part of their duty; and they 
should bear in mind that the character of the 
regiment, as to proficiency in Light Infantry 
movements, depends mainly on the individual 
intelligence, skill, and activity displayed by the 
men.6 
The off icers ' m a i n g u i d e to a p p r o v e d 
procedures both for the parade ground and the 
battlefield was the publication Field Exercises and 
Evolutions of Infantry. The 1867 edition of this 
work was used by the forces in Halifax for most 
of the period discussed here. It contained much 
on the proper methods of physically handling the 
new Snider-Enfield rifle, bu t precious little on 
the manner in which its use, or for that matter 
the use of similar weapons by the enemy, affected 
actual battlefield techniques.7 In fact it was the 
1870 edition of this work, which first arrived in 
Halifax in September of that year, that attempted 
to do this to any significant degree. It contained, 
for the first time, lengthy sections dealing with 
the principles of skirmishing, noting that the 
object w a s "to e n a b l e t he so ld ier to t ake 
advantage of cover, and thus inflict the greatest 
loss upon the enemy with the least amount of 
danger to himself.8 A section entitled "Shelter-
T rench a n d Pit Exercise" even conta ined a 
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r e fe rence t o t h e de s i r ab i l i t y u n d e r s o m e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of digging in. "Taking in to 
consideration the long range, extreme accuracy, 
and great rapidity of fire of the rifled small a rms 
now in use ," this section began, "it may be 
desirable to shelter the troops from unnecessary 
exposure, provided this can be done without 
harassing the men."9 
As the caveat in this last sentence suggests, 
however, a l though the 1870 Field Exercises 
represented a sizable step forward in adjusting 
British infantry tactics to the new era, the new 
t e c h n i q u e s s t i l l we re n o t e m b r a c e d 
w h o l e h e a r t e d l y . I n d e e d m a n y r e f e r e n c e s 
remained in it to more traditional practices such 
as forming squares, volley firing, and advancing 
in formal order. This may have been to some 
extent due to their continued application in some 
colonial campaigns, as indeed continued to be 
the case up to the end of the century. By 1869, 
however, they would certainly have proved out 
of date in a war with any European, or more 
direct ly re levan t to t he t roops in Halifax, 
American power.10 
As noted earlier the most common form of 
battlefield training in Halifax was the field day 
and sham fight. The latter was almost wholly 
useless as effective training for battle since it was 
quite formalized and often resolved itself into 
movements quite similar to those of the parade 
square . They are interesting nonetheless, as they 
show what was still conceived of as probably the 
ideal manner in which a battle should unfold 
(a l though even au tho r i t i e s in Halifax were 
probably realistic enough to realize that battles 
seldom developed in an ideal manner). 
The clearest description of the classic form of 
such an engagement is contained in a report in the 
Halifax newspaper the Evening Reporter of one 
which was held on the Common on 26 August 1869. 
The occasion was the visit to the city of Prince Arthur, 
seventh child of Queen Victoria (and later, as Duke 
of Connaught, Governor General of Canada from 
1911 to 1916). The participants were all the British 
units in garrison - facing west, they were the 78th 
Highlanders on the right, or north end of the line, 
flanked on their left by a company of Royal Marines 
(off the ships of the Royal Navy then in harbour), 
followed by a company of Royal Marine Artillery 
with four field guns, then by the 1/16th Regiment, 
flanked in turn by the Royal Artillery, and on the 
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left, or south end of the line, 300 sailors from 
the flag ship of the North American station, the 
Royal Alfred. (With numbers such as these, one 
c a n well imagine w h a t a mass ive mi l i ta ry 
spectacle this would have been.) 
The affair began with the Royal Marine 
Artillery being thrown forward onto the slopes of 
Camp Hill, site of the present day hospital, bu t 
then an unoccupied knoll. As described in the 
Reporter. 
The bugle sounds the advance and at the same 
time the skirmishers open fire. Away scamper 
the little boys and cows, whose curiosity has 
led them to wander in front of the advance; but 
the skirmish line steadily advances and the 
Snider "Barks" incessantly. The first line of the 
attack is composed of the Royal Artillery and 
the 16th Regt., and as the skirmishers cross 
the stream [that is, Freshwater Brook which 
then roughly bisected the Common before 
emptying into Griffen's Pond in the Public 
Gardens] The line opens fire, and for a minute 
or two there is one deafening roar of musketry. 
The skirmish line retire, and the order to charge 
is given which is done; again the line halts and 
again it fires a deafening volley. The order to 
retire is then given and skirmishers are thrown 
out to cover the retreat. The second line of attack 
cons i s t i ng of the sa i lors and the 78 th 
Highlanders, then advances, and goes through 
similar manoeuvres. The Marine Battery on 
Camp Hill opens fire while the Highlanders 
march to the right of the field. By this time each 
brigade is formed on its own ground, and the 
order "prepare to meet cavalry" is given. Squares 
are immediately formed, and firing commences 
again. The movement was performed with great 
precision and alacrity, and was much admired 
by the spectators. 
This was the last manoeuvre of the "engagement" 
after which the imaginary enemy was presumably 
declared defeated, and the troops reformed back 
into columns and proudly marched off to their 
respective quarters.1 1 
Reaction to this public demonstra t ion of 
military fire power and manoeuvre was mixed. 
The effect that such displays doubtless had on 
some who wi tnessed them can probably be 
summed up in the words of the reporter for the 
Citizen newspaper, who declared: 
although we never forget that it was all a 
pageant, yet so attractive is the very mimicry of 
war, we were moved at the sight, and proud that 
our interests are so deeply identified with a 
country that wields a power like this.12 
In fact the movements here were all very 
m u c h N a p o l e o n i c (or m o r e p r o p e r l y 
Wellingtonian) in nature. The skirmishers thrown 
in advance of the various movements were almost 
certainly those that had preceded the advancing 
lines in the old smooth-bore, muzzle-loading era. 
The firing seems to have been all in volley, and 
the forming of squares was one of the classic 
manoeuvres of the older era. Thus the reporter 
for the Acadian Reporter newspaper was probably 
m o r e mi l i t a r i ly a s t u t e t h a n h i s Citizen 
counterpart when he commented that: "As a 
military show the affair was quite good, b u t as a 
display of military tactics it cannot be denied that 
it was a blundering concern."13 
This was, of course, a spectacle pu t on for 
the benefit of visiting royalty, and it doubtless 
had much of the formalized pageant about it. 
Another sham fight that was held about a year 
and a half later on 16 March 1871. After the 
arrival in Halifax of the 1870 drill book, and after 
the Franco-Prussian War had reemphasised all 
the lessons of the new era, it is probably of more 
military interest. This exercise was dubbed "The 
Battle of Rockhead," by the local press after the 
city prison under whose glowering walls it was 
mostly "fought." It doubtless had much more of 
a real field situation about it, and was taken 
much more seriously by those who participated. 
In addition to the British regulars, all the local 
militia uni ts took part, which made it one of the 
largest military exercises yet to be held in Halifax 
in time of peace. The militia's involvement was 
something of a departure for this period, for the 
operations of the local forces and the regulars 
were usually kept quite distinct from one another. 
Indeed, the two were regularly brought together 
only once a year, for the celebration of the Queen's 
birthday on 24 May, and then only for such 
ceremonial procedures as an inspection, a march 
past, and the firing of a feu de joie. In his M.A. 
thesis, "Local Boys and Red Coats," Roger Sarty 
attributes this lack of co-ordination to two main 
factors: first, the Canadian federal government's 
concern at this time that its militia forces not be 
seen as simply an adjunct of the imperial power; 
and second, the British military's failure to 
adequately address the problems of defending 
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coastal fortresses in the new technological age, 
and thus not being prepared to push the issue 
(and pay the costs) of militia-imperial troop co-
operation. This, of course, resulted in a situation 
that was somewhat bizarre to say the least, for it 
was taken for granted by both Canadian and 
British authorities in these years that in the event 
of the Halifax fortress ever being attacked, the 
chief role of the militia would be to come to the 
aid of the British regulars. Yet it was not until 
the 1890s, and the implementation of formal 
defence scheme exercises, tha t they began to be 
joined together for operational or field training 
on any sort of a regular basis.14 That the 1871 
exercise was held at all is probably a tribute to 
the diplomatic and persuasive skills of the British 
g e n e r a l officer c o m m a n d i n g in Hal i fax, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Hastings Doyle. 
Doyle, the mastermind behind this exercise, 
remains an intriguing character, and merits some 
brief attention. A mixture of curmudgeon and 
charmer, a deft hand with the ladies but a lifelong 
bachelor, something of military mart inet bu t 
capable of great generosity and good humour, 
he w a s one of t h e g r e a t c h a r a c t e r s of 
Confederat ion-era Canada . Yet, he h a s not 
r ece ived h i s d u e from h i s t o r i a n s a n d / o r 
biographers, although admittedly their efforts 
would be hampered by the fact that there seems 
to be no surviving collection of Doyle papers.15 
Doyle had been commander-in-chief in Halifax 
since 1861, and had firmly established himself 
on both the local military and political scene. 
Indeed since the day tha t confederation was 
enacted (1 July 1867) he had also served as the 
province's lieutenant-governor. In this capacity 
his role was to do what he could to reconcile 
Nova S c o t i a n s t o t h e n e w l y - e n a c t e d 
constitutional arrangements, which a majority 
in the province found unacceptable. Through 
exercising a judicious blend of tact and firmness 
in his handl ing of the anti-confederate Nova 
Scotian government, he was able to significantly 
a d v a n c e th i s c a u s e . At the s a m e t ime, by 
capitalizing on a longstanding friendship with the 
leading Nova Scotian anti-confederate, Joseph 
Howe, and a mutually respectful relationship 
with the Canadian prime minister, Sir J o h n A. 
Macdonald, he played a significant behind the 
scenes role in the negotiations leading up to the 
'better terms' deal worked out between Howe and 
Macdonald in J anua ry 1869, and also in Howe's 
s u c c e s s f u l bid for e lec t ion to t he federal 
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Charles Hastings Doyle, ca.1870, commander of the 
Halifax garrison, 1861-1874, and lieutenant-governor 
of Nova Scotia, 1867-1874. Doyle planned and 
organized the "Battle of Rockhead" in 1871. 
(NAC C-10106) 
parliament in a by-election in Hants County in 
April of that year. 
As the scion of a prominent Irish military 
family, however, Doyle's first love was soldiering. 
Thus in the four years that he remained in the 
province after Howe's by-election victory he 
concentrated most of his energies upon his role 
as commander-in-chief. Doyle was a capable and 
energetic soldier, and, evidently chafing at the 
lack of oppor tun i t i es to display th i s in h i s 
normally quiet command, he eagerly seized upon 
chances to do so on the rare occasions that they 
presented themselves. Thus during the famous 
Trent crisis of 1862, he gained distinction for 
h i s m a s t e r y of t h e l og i s t i c s invo lved in 
transshipping troops arriving in Halifax across 
the snows of New Brunswick to Quebec. And in 
April 1866, when a large force of Fenians massed 
menacingly along the Maine-New Brunswick 
frontier he responded with alacrity to the request 
of the New Brunswick lieutenant-governor to 
send aid. He quickly assembled a large force 
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consisting of 59 artillery with field guns, 80 Royal 
Engineers, plus a full regiment of infantry, and 
personal ly leading them to the scene of the 
troubles.16 The Battle of Rockhead was evidently 
another opportuni ty for Doyle to display his 
talents. 
Doyle h a d travelled to Britain in the fall of 
1870, a n d while he was the re the F ranco-
Prussian War had broken out, with the French 
army defeated by the Prussian at Sedan on 1 
September (al though Paris did not fall unti l 
J a n u a r y 1871). Britain, and indeed all Europe, 
was shocked by the results, for in a short decisive 
campaign the expertly mobilized and brilliantly 
led armies of Prussia had completely routed those 
of France, hitherto considered Europe's best. Two 
of the lessons tha t this war were considered to 
have taught was the necessity of exercising large 
n u m b e r s of t roops together, a n d s ince the 
Prussian military organization was based upon 
a system of reserves, of bringing regular and 
reserve forces together more closely. S u c h 
considerations certainly lay behind the sweeping 
reorganization of the British army that the Liberal 
Secretary of State for War, Edward Cardwell, was 
at tha t momen t under tak ing in Britain, and 
evidently they were the l essons t h a t Doyle 
concluded needed to be learned in Halifax.17 
To this end, upon his re turn to Halifax he 
set to work organizing a large military enterprise 
for which he ensured the participation not only 
of all the imperial forces in the city - the 78th 
Highlanders, the 61st Foot, and the 3rd and 4th 
Batteries of the 3rd Brigade Royal Artillery - bu t 
also all of the local militia units - the 63rd Halifax 
Rifles, the 66th Halifax Battalion of Infantry, the 
1st and 2nd Brigades Halifax Garrison Artillery, 
and the Halifax Field Battery. The "enemy" was 
to be c o m p o s e d of m e m b e r s of t he Royal 
Engineers and some Royal Artillery, although for 
the most part the opposing forces were composed 
of what were termed "imaginaries" - that is they 
were nonexistent. Altogether it is estimated that 
about 2,500 real troops took part. 
This large force was assembled on the Grand 
Parade - that is the open area that separates 
Halifax City Hall from St. Paul's Church, between 
Barrington Street and Argyle Street - on the 
m o r n i n g of 16 March . The 7 8 t h a n d 61s t 
regulars, forming up at the south end in front of 
St. Paul's had, according to the reporter for the 
Morning Chronicle, doffed their winter greatcoats 
for the occasion, and presented a "pretty sight 
as they stood in a solid body, with uniforms of 
scarlet and other br ight colours, a n d 'fixed' 
bayonets flashing in the sunlight."18 (The men of 
the 61st were wearing for the first time in Halifax 
the new dark blue glengarry style forage caps 
which had been introduced in 1868. The 78th 
would have been wearing their own traditional 
glengarries with Highland diced border, and 
trews, not kilts which they gave up wearing in 
Halifax during the winter period.) 
As overheard by the reporter for the Acadian 
Recorder, Doyle called the officers forward and 
made some preliminary remarks to them before 
ordering them to move off, to the effect that: 
the battle.. .about to be waged was arranged on 
the principles evolved during the campaign 
recently closed between France and Germany. 
He observed that the great success of Von Moltke 
and Bismarck, the real victors in the war, was 
owing to the systematic manner in which their 
plan of operations was laid out and that as 
clockwork were all the contrivances resorted to 
by which the immense German Army was 
controlled.19 
For the pu rposes of the exercise, it was 
assumed that the enemy had landed and taken 
possession of a small village occupied by Blacks 
that was situated on the shore of Bedford Basin 
jus t inside the narrows. This, of course, was what 
became commonly known as Africville around 
the tu rn of this century, and that continued to 
be one of t h e c i ty ' s m o r e n o t a b l e b l a c k 
communities until it was demolished and its 
population dispersed during a process of so-
called u rban renewal in the 1960s. Before the 
name of Africville took hold it was known simply 
as Campbell Road, after an old road that ran 
near-by, although whether it had this name at 
the time of the events discussed here is not 
known (it w a s no t so-cal led in any of the 
newspaper accounts).20 
The position of the black inhabitants of the 
settlement in the day's events (the newspapers 
are typically devoid of any direct reference), will 
not be discussed here nor will an at tempt be 
made to ascertain what the episode might reveal 
concerning the state of relations between the 
black and white races in Halifax in this period. 
While certainly interesting and important , it 
55 
7
Pulsifer: The Battle of Rockhead, March 1871
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1996
The fullest accounts of the day's action 
appeared In two of the city's major newspapers: 
the Citizen and the Acadian Recorder. Somewhat 
tongue-in-cheek in approach, and heavily biased 
In favour of the accomplishments of the local 
militia forces as opposed to the British regulars, 
inevitably these accounts omit much that is of 
interest to the military historian. Nonetheless 
they are written with a certain amount of colour 
and verve, and they are the only record that we 
have of the event. Hence their accounts will be 
quoted at some length. 
With General Doyle and his staff in the lead, 
followed immediately by the 78th and the 61st 
Regiments, the defending forces advanced along 
Gottingen Street to meet the invaders. As they 
passed by Wellington Barracks and neared the 
enemy, the 78th and the 66th Halifax Battalion 
were thrown off to the left to occupy a crucial 
position on a spot known as Meizner's Hill, which 
overlooked the entire peninsula thereabouts and 
which unaccountably the enemy had failed to 
opens up a whole new area of discussion that is 
quite tangential to the main concern here, however 
much it cries out to be addressed. 
From the Black settlement the enemy was 
presumed to have pushed inland, and to have 
occupied in force the ground around Rockhead city 
prison, on the heights above. Rockhead, a large 
granite Victorian 'pile' of a building, with two wings 
extending off a central octagon structure, had been 
opened in 1860 and continued to serve as the city's 
main place of confinement for city felons into the 
1960s. The building was finally demolished in the 
same program of urban redevelopment that 
witnessed the eradication of Africville. From the 
grounds of this imposing structure he was 
presumed to have despatched small parties as far 
forward as Fort Needham. This was then as now 
an unoccupied hillock (the site of an old fort) off 
Gottingen Street just north of and within site of 
one of the major military establishments in Halifax, 
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Rockhead City Prison. Opened in 1860, Rockhead remained the major place of confinement for those convicted 
of city crimes into the 1960s. During the 19th Century a goodly portion of its inmates were soldiers of the 
British garrison. Around its walls swirled the "Battle of Rockhead" of 1871. 
(Public Archives of Nova Scotia Collection N-989) 
for, from that point they gradually fell back from 
one good cover to ano the r In an a lmost 
unaccountable sort of way.21 
With the troops moving on, the stage was 
then set for the crucial action around Rockhead. 
(According the Recorder the enemy at this point 
consisted of a small force of Royal Artillery with 
a cider barrel as its sole piece of heavy 
armament!) The geographical situation here was 
roughly as follows: Rockhead prison sat on the 
northern extremity of Gottingen Street and in 
front of it toward the basin was a short plateau 
which then sloped off fairly dramatically 
towards the Basin and the Black community 
on its shores. On the other side of the village 
towards the water ran the t racks of the 
Annapolis-Halifax Railway, which wended their 
way on to Richmond Depot further on in the 
city's nor thern suburbs . Here the action 
unfolded, according to the account in the 
Citizen: 
The Volunteers with skirmishers thrown out 
right and left, advancing valiantly towards 
Rockhead. Rapidly extending along the Prison 
enclosure on the left, supported by a field piece, 
the skirmishers were soon hotly engaged; their 
comrades of Rifles on the right were also 
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occupy. Then a thrust was made up the slopes 
of Fort Needham, dislodging his advance party, 
and a couple of Armstrong field pieces mounted 
thereupon to cover the advance. 
Thereafter, for the first time serious 
opposition was encountered. The advance from 
that point is graphically described by the 
Acadian Recorder: 
The fire opened by the enemy upon our centre 
columns just as we moved to the Westward of 
Fort Needham. And much distressed our centre 
was too. No wonder; for there they were thus 
wedged into a sort of funnel, opposed to a 
concentrated fire from the enemy, with no room 
to deploy, and for a long time without a gun in 
position to cover or aid their advance. The 
enemy had thrown up barricades quite across 
Gottingen Road, opposite Merkel's gate, thus 
completely entrenching himself we may say. 
From this barricade the fire was particularly 
galling. At length a half battery of the 1st 
Halifax Brigade of Artillery under Captain 
Albro, acting as Light Troops made a dash at 
the provoking barricade and carried it at the 
point of the bayonet. It was one of the finest 
things in the whole engagement. It turned the 
tide for the day; for, really up to that point 
things were looking critical. The success of this 
exploit seems to have demoralized the enemy; 
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energetically pressing the enemy's sharpshooters, 
and steadily advancing over the uneven ground. 
Meanwhile the skirmishers on the left were 
pressed, but die main body of the centre came up 
in the nick of time, and as the skirmishers fell 
back, the artillery opened on the advancing enemy 
with their Armstrongs, and after a hot fire 
compelled them to evacuate their position. The 
prison thus being released from the grip of the foe, 
the centre followed up the advantage by rapidly 
marching to the open plateau in front of the Prison 
overlooking the basin.22 
M e a n w h i l e , the Recorder n o t e d the following 
incident in the mids t of the fray: 
At the very gate of Rockhead the reckless dauntless 
Taillebois of the Cider-Barrel Brigade took his 
stand witii an obstinacy as if he would never yield 
another point. This began to look so serious that 
even the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff were 
provoked into charging upon the now-to-be-
immolated Taillebois. He was utterly routed and 
driven from the field.23 
The Citizen's a c c o u n t cont inued: 
The Artillery were stat ioned on the road, 
commanding the advance, here the troops were 
halted while they poured in a steady and well 
directed fire upon the enemy who fell back upon 
the railway, partially sheltered by the houses of 
the Black settiement. The order to advance then 
rang out and over the rocks, broken ground, slush, 
snow and clumps of trees, resolutely marched the 
men. By the time the precipice overlooking the 
settiement and the shore was reached, matters 
wore a dark and dirty aspect.24 
And on t h e left, t he Recorder observed that : 
In the midst of the enemy's discomfort at the fall 
of Rockhead, the 66th (Bremner's Regt.) as yet in 
reserve, was ordered up, much to the delight of 
the men and their gallant commanding officers. 
They and the 78th Highlanders, whom they 
supported, re-opened the contest by a real infantry 
"set-to" with the enemy. Then again was to be seen 
that "thin red line" of which history speaks, and 
which has such a terrible meaning to the foes of 
our country. Nothing could resist it in this instance. 
Away went the enemy - no longer retiring in order, 
but pell mell, and as their retreat was down a steep 
hill, the effects of it were all the more apparent.25 
And the conclusion, repor ted in the Citizen: 
The 61st Regt. had by this time, it appears, 
succeeded in turning the enemy's right, and were 
in full possession of the village, when the new 
battlefield came into view. Forming in line on the 
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railroad skirting the village, the 61st and the 
Volunteers poured into the discomfited ranks of 
the enemy terrific volleys, while Volunteer Artillery, 
on the heights above, thundered out round after 
round with terrible effect. 
.. .The enemy was driven clear into the water. The 
troops [then] reformed, the 61st marching home 
by Richmond Depot, Royal Artillery and Volunteers 
by the three mile house road and Gottingen Street. 
There were a number of spectators on the 
battlefield who like the U.S, Senators , 
Congressmen, and others at the battle of "Bull 
Run" were attracted there to see the fun. ...We 
heard one old "cuss" express his indignation at 
the battle. He was an ex colonel of militia and said 
he was at a loss to tell which was in more confusion, 
the defeated enemy or the victors, when the climax 
of the fight was reached.26 
What t h e n are we to m a k e of th is exercise? 
Unfortunately there a re no afteraction repor t s by 
the military to allow us to ascer ta in exactly w h a t 
they t h o u g h t of it, nor, as far as c a n be found, does 
Doyle m a k e a n y further reference to i t (which m a y 
itself be a comment ) . Cer ta inly t h e n e w s p a p e r s 
tended to emphas ize the exercise's farcical element, 
a l though one shou ld be leery a b o u t accept ing th is 
too readily as a valid m e a s u r e of its military value, 
as m a n y Halifax repor ters in th is e ra t e n d e d to 
special ize in t h i s style of wr i t ing in de sc r ib ing 
military events of this n a t u r e . There s eemed to have 
b e e n s o m e t h i n g i n the i r p u r p o s e f u l n e s s , t he i r 
s e r iousness of intent , their grandiosi ty p e r h a p s , 
which a w a k e n e d in t h e m a desire to deflate. 
O n e c a n cer ta inly tell from t h e s e a c c o u n t s , 
however deficient they m a y be in cer ta in respects , 
t ha t the bat t le of Rockhead w a s a d e p a r t u r e from 
t h e u s u a l style of s h a m fight desc r ibed earlier. 
Indeed w h a t s e e m s to have b e e n a more open, fluid 
style of movemen t m a y have b e e n an a t t e m p t to 
utilize tac t ics s imi lar to t h o s e employed in t h e 
c a m p a i g n s r ecen t ly w a g e d i n E u r o p e , a n d a s 
r e c o m m e n d e d for a d o p t i o n i n t h e m o s t r e c e n t 
ed i t ions of Queen's Regulations a n d t h e Field 
Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry. Breech-loading 
artillery was u s e d extensively b u t probably n o t in 
a s in tens ive c o n c e n t r a t i o n s a s w a s n o w b e i n g 
r e c o m m e n d e d , a l t h o u g h th i s m a y h a v e mere ly 
reflected the n u m b e r of g u n s t ha t were available in 
Halifax a t the t ime. Also the fact t ha t there were no 
references to s q u a r e s hav ing b e e n fo rmed is a 
favourable sign, the role of cavalry on the m o d e r n 
battlefield having by now been proved pract ical ly 
hopeless . 
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Above: The entrance to 
Wellington Barracks, ca. 1870. 
The Citadel and Wellington 
Barracks were the British 
garrison's two main infantry 
barracks at this time. The first 
building inside housed the rank 
andjile; the building further in, 
visible through the archway, 
housed the officers. At this time 
the barracks were occupied by 
the 78th Highland Regiment of 
Foot. One of its members can 
be seen standing outside in 
walking out dress; members of 
the barracks guard infull dress 
can be seen inside the gate. 
(NAC PA 119660) 
Right: Men's Quarters, 
Wellington Barracks during 
troop review, ca. 1863. 
(NAC PA 143690) 
On the other hand there is not much evidence 
of the troops Involved seeking cover, and this may 
reflect an initial misapprehension about the effect 
of the new weapons that became widespread in 
the wake of the rather speedy Prussian victory 
over France - that is that they favoured the attack 
over the defence. Analyses that pointed out the 
error of this interpretation were to appear in 
Europe before long but probably none would have 
been known in Halifax by the time of the Battle 
of Rockhead. Thus with hindsight one can say 
tha t however valiant the bayonet charge by 
Captain Albro and the Halifax Artillery against 
the barricade on Gottingen Street may have been, 
its end results almost certainly would have been 
suicidal. All in all then the affair was rather a 
headlong rush to victory, entailing few at tempts 
to deal with really serious difficulties, and of itself 
does not seem to have been the type of exercise 
that would have prepared Halifax defenders to 
meet a truly determined enemy, even one so 
foolhardy as to at tempt a landing in Bedford 
Basin. 
It did, however, give the British regulars and 
the local militia a chance to work together in 
something other than a parade situation, and to 
this end it almost certainly would have been 
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useful. Indeed, it was probably an example of 
the type of exercise which needed to be repeated 
with much more frequency and with greater 
sophistication, if the diverse forces responsible 
for defending Halifax were to learn to function 
together cohesively and effectively. But as has 
been seen, this was the only exercise of this 
scope to be held in this era, and as such must 
be seen mostly as a lone instance of the ripple 
effects of the Franco-Prussian War on Halifax. 
Certainly it would appear that Hastings Doyle, 
the commander of the Halifax garrison, was well 
aware of the significance of this campaign as a 
military event. Nonetheless, despite his 
commendable feat of getting the event in Halifax 
organized at all, it would also seem that the 
opportunity had been missed of ensuring that 
the forces under his command were able to 
benefit from some of the tactical lessons that 
the Franco-Prussian War as well as earlier 
campaigns had t augh t regarding the 
deportment of troops on the modern battlefield. 
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